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The Congressional Contempt Power: A Lethal Weapon in the Battle
over Information?
Introduction
According to Representative Henry A. Waxman of the House
Oversight Committee, “A subpoena is not a request; it’s a demand
for information.”1

Waxman’s words cut to the heart of the

ongoing controversy between the Congress and the White House
over two competing powers: Congressional oversight and executive
privilege.
The dispute centers on Congressional investigations into the
firing of eight U.S. attorneys (nearly ten percent of America’s
top prosecutors2) in December 2006.

Earlier in that same year,

the USA Patriot Act was reauthorized to include a provision that
allowed Attorney General Alberto R. Gonzales to appoint
replacement prosecutors on an indefinite basis, without approval
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by the Senate.3

The connection between the amended Patriot Act

and these firings has prompted much speculation over whether the
firings were motivated by the political agenda of the Bush
Administration. Many have questioned whether “some of the U.S.
attorneys were fired because they were investigating Republican
wrongdoing too energetically or not investigating Democrats
vigorously enough in the view of the White House.”4 One Senator
said that the firings “reek of politics” and “[e]ven the hiring
and firing of our top federal prosecutors has become infused and
corrupted with political, rather than prudent, considerations.”5
Justice Department officials repeatedly affirmed that the
firings were based on personnel decisions related to the
prosecutors “performance-related” problems. However, on March 2,
2007, “officials acknowledged that the ousters were based
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primarily on the administration’s unhappiness with the
prosecutors’ policy decisions and revealed the White House’s
role in the matter.”6

In response to the speculation over the

political nature of the firings, Attorney General Alberto
Gonzales stated,
I acknowledge that mistakes were made here. I accept the
responsibility. And my pledge to the American people is to
find out what went wrong here, to access accountability and to
make improvements so that the mistakes that occurred in this
instance do not occur again in the future.7
On August 27, 2007, Alberto Gonzales resigned.8
Outraged by the political scandal currently tainting the
Department of Justice, Congress has taken action to investigate
the circumstances surrounding the firings.

In pursuit of

answers, Congress has issued subpoenas ordering members of the
Bush Administration, including Karl Rove, Chief of Staff, Joshua
Bolten, and former White House counsel Harriet Miers, to testify
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about their roles or knowledge regarding the firings.9
efforts however have been rebuked.

Their

Subpoenaed White House

officials including Harriet Miers and Karl Rove have refused to
testify, asserting “executive privilege.”10 In response, Congress
has initiated proceedings to hold these officials in contempt,
invoking 2 U.S.C. sections 192 and 194, an infrequently used
statutory power which under certain circumstances authorizes
Congress to issue criminal contempt citations against an
individual who refuses to comply with a subpoena.11
Thus, the stage is set for an all-out battle between Congress
and the White House over access to information.

Put in a

broader perspective, this conflict implicates the fundamental
principle of separation of powers, which has been blurred under
the auspices of the Bush Administration.
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This note seeks not to analyze the abuse of executive
privilege but rather focuses on Congress’ remedy against itnamely contempt citations.
Part I outlines the basic doctrine of executive privilege and
analyzes its connection to Congress’ power to conduct
investigations.

Part II then discusses the history and scope of

Congress’ power to hold individuals who refuse to heed to its
subpoenas in contempt.

Specifically, Part II analyzes three

manifestations of the contempt power: inherent contempt,
criminal contempt, and civil contempt.

This discussion will

also compare the strengths and weaknesses of each mode of the
contempt power.
Part III discusses the official position of the Department of
Justice on the Congressional contempt power and how that has
historically and presently influenced its exercise.

Part IV

tracks Congress’ current use of the contempt power in its quest
to investigate the U.S. Attorney firings. This section concludes
with exposing the inherent flaw in the criminal contempt power
which threatens to undermine its effectiveness.

The apparent

dilemma is that in order to issue a contempt citation, Congress
must refer the matter to the U.S. Attorney, who bears the
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responsibility of submitting the matter to a grand jury.12

This

section concludes with pointing out that it is unrealistic for
the U.S. Attorney to follow through with this duty, given that
it is a direct action against itself.
Finally, Part V proposes a judicial solution which circumvents
the inherent problems with the contempt citation remedy.
Specifically, this proposal suggests that a three judge panel be
convened to determine whether the congressional subpoenas are
valid over objections of executive privilege.

This judicial

alternative requires appointing an independent prosecutor to
bring the case on behalf of Congress before the panel for
adjudication.

The panel would ultimately decide whether or not

to issue an injunction ordering the White House officials to
submit to the subpoenas.
When the legislative and executive branches are beyond
reconciliation, as they are today, only a judicial remedy can
preserve the balance of power.

This proposal thus aims to use

judicial integrity to restore public confidence in the
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President of the Senate or Speaker of the House...to
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government in terms of the relationship between Congress and the
Executive on such sensitive issues.
I.

Overview of Executive Privilege

The scope of Congress’ ability to investigate the operations
of the executive branch is inexorably tied to the doctrine of
executive privilege.

Thus, in order to analyze Congress’ power

of contempt, it is first necessary to visit the doctrine of
executive privilege, for contempt is a direct remedy against its
abuses.

The idea behind executive privilege is that members of

the executive branch can preclude Congress and/or the courts,
and ultimately the public from accessing documents, probing
conversations, and hearing testimony on the grounds that the
Constitution grants the President a right to secrecy when it
comes to issues of national security and protecting privacy when
it is in the best interest of the public.13

Executive privilege

however, is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, but
rather has been interpreted as emanating from the constitutional
powers granted to the President under the vesting clause of
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Article II, and the Commander in Chief Clause, and derived from
the basic construct of separation of powers.14
Executive privilege enjoys a long history of being invoked by
many presidents, dating as far back as George Washington and
Thomas Jefferson.15

In more recent times, the Supreme Court has

validated executive privilege in United States v. Nixon, where
although the Court held that executive privilege did not shield
Nixon from withholding classified tapes and documents, it
simultaneously affirmed the validity of executive privilege in
other circumstances.16

In evaluating the interests of the

President and his officials, the Court found that “the privilege
is fundamental to the operation of Government and inextricably
rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution.”17
While the Court recognized a qualified privilege, it seemed to
limit its application to certain contexts, particularly to
claims of the need to protect national security.18
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circumstances, it is less clear whether executive privilege will
trump Congressional subpoenas.

In Walker v. Cheney, one of the

rare recent cases addressing executive privilege, the Court
sided with the administration in its refusal to disclose records
from Vice President Dick Cheney’s Energy Task Force.19
Despite the Court’s decisions in U.S. v. Nixon and Walker v.
Cheney, courts have generally shied away from stepping in to
adjudicate conflicts between the legislative and executive over
executive privilege.20

Moreover, few such disputes have even

made it to the courts because for the most part, the conflicts
are negotiated on the political playing field; “one side usually
blinks first, and a court fight is averted.”21

One journalist

difficult to accept the argument that even the very important
interest in confidentiality of Presidential communications is
significantly diminished by production of such material....”).
19

Walker v. Cheney, 230 F.Supp.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
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reached the courts for substantive resolution, the vast majority
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offers the reason for this preference being that “political
imperatives often trump high-brow legal principles.

A White

House that looks as if it is hiding something pays a political
price.

The same is true of a Congress that looks too much like

an inquisition.”22

Therefore, judicial precedent or guidance for

defining the boundaries of executive privilege is lacking.
This is especially disconcerting given that the Bush
Administration can be characterized by an attempt to expand the
scope of executive privilege.23

According to legal scholar Mark

Rozell, “President Bush chose some very nontraditional cases for
reestablishing executive privilege.”24

Examples include where

the President attempted to expand the scope of executive
privilege for former presidents, and where the Bush
administration endeavored to apply the doctrine to protect

achieving resolution through political negotiation and
accommodation.” Id. at 1.
22
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Department of Justice documents from investigations that had
already been closed.25

Stated by Rozell, “[t]he common thread in

the Bush Administration case is the use of executive privilege
in circumstances where there is little precedent for such
action.”26 The Bush Administration’s attempts at expanding
executive privilege have come to a head in the U.S. Attorney
scandal, where members of the executive branch have asserted
executive privilege in order to escape testifying and
publicizing documents.
In response to Congressional demands for testimony and
documents, the administration has agreed to release certain emails from within the Justice Department “but has drawn the line
at releasing communications among members of the White House
staff, citing the tradition that a president is entitled to
advice from his aides that does not have to be couched out of
concern that it will become public.”27

Invoking the shield of

executive privilege, President Bush made it clear that he would
oppose any subpoenas brought against White House officials,
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stating that “We will not go along with a partisan fishing
expedition aimed at honorable public servants.”28
The pertinent question is whether absent direct judicial
findings regarding the validity of executive privilege claims,
Congress has any effective means with which to test such
assertions.

The next section will discuss Congress’ power to

issue contempt citations as a remedy against the claims of
executive privilege.

II.

Congress’ Remedy: The Contempt Power
A. Investigatory Authority: The Scope

Just as the Constitution fails to explicitly mention executive
privilege, so too does it lack any direct reference to Congress’
power to issue contempt citations.

Rather, Congress’ authority

to issue contempt citations derives from its Article I powers
and the overarching doctrine of separation of powers.29

It is

28

Id.

29

See Morton Rosenberg & Todd Tatelman, Congress’s contempt

power: a sketch, CRS Report RL34119, August 1, 2007 at 1 (“While
there is no express provision of the Constitution or specific
statute authorizing the conduct of congressional oversight or
investigations, the Supreme Court has firmly established that
such power is essential to the legislative function as to be
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further validated by a long history of its implementation,
recognition by the Supreme Court, and its eventual incorporation
into statute.30

Moreover, “[t]he power of Congress to punish for

implied from the general vesting of legislative powers in
Congress”). See also, U.S. Const. art. I, §1 (“All legislative
powers...shall be vested in a Congress of the United States,
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives.”).
30

Congress first used the contempt powering 1795, when three

members of the House of Representatives issued contempt
citations against two individuals who reportedly attempted to
bribe them.

Morton Rosenberg & Todd B. Tatelman, Congress’

Contempt Power: A Sketch, CRS Report RL34119, August 1, 2007, at
3.

Under the contempt power, the House proceeded to arrest and

detain the accused pending further investigation.

Id.

The

first time the Supreme Court upheed the constitutionality of the
contempt power was in 1821, in Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204
(1821).

“Between 1795 and 1857, 14 inherent contempt actions

were initiated by the House and Senate” and because the existing
procedure at the time seemed inefficient, “[i]n 1857, a
statutory criminal contempt procedure was enacted....” Id. at7.
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contempt is inextricably related to the power of Congress to
investigate.”31
In McGrain v. Daughtery, the Supreme Court validated Congress’
authority to conduct oversight and investigations.32

The facts

of McGrain are startlingly similar to the scandal surrounding
the Department of Justice today.

Harry M. Daughtery had been

the Attorney General from 1921-1924, and was the central figure
surrounding a Senate investigation of various charges of
misfeasance and nonfeasance in the Department of Justice under
his reign.33 The Senate committee heading the investigation
subpoenaed the former Attorney General’s brother, commanding him
to give testimony and submit documents that were suspected to
corroborate suspicions of unethical activity.34
individual failed to appear.35

The summoned

In determining whether Congress

had the power to compel a private individual to appear before
it, the Court opined that
[T]he power of inquiry-with process to enforce it-is an
essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative
31
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function....[A] legislative body cannot legislate wisely or
effectively in the absence of information respecting the
conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or
change....36
Subsequent Court rulings such as Eastland v. United States
Servicemen’s Fund37 and Watkins v. United States38 have reaffirmed
Congress’ power to investigate.

In Eastland, the subpoena

issued on behalf of a Senate subcommittee directing that a
certain bank produce all its records pertaining to the United
States Servicemen’s Fund, was met with refusal. The Court held
that that Congress’ authority to issue subpoenas falls within
the sphere of the Speech and Debate clause of the Constitution.39
The Court found that authority to issue a subpoena in the midst
of an investigation is “an indispensable ingredient of law
making” without which Congress’ role of lawmaking and
deliberating “would be meaningless.”40
Similarly, in Watkins, where the petitioner was held in
contempt for failing to make certain disclosures to the UnAmerican Activities Committee, the Court once again defined the
36

Id. at 175.

37
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scope of Congress’ investigative powers as “broad” in that it
“encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing
laws as well as proposed or possible needed statutes.”41
Although the Court ultimately held that petitioner’s conviction
for refusal to answer was invalid under due process, it made a
point of validating Congress’ power to issue contempt citations
as derived from its right to inquiry.42
In Wilkinson v. United States, the Court set forth five
requirements for the validity of a Congressional subpoena.43
These include: 1)the investigation must be authorized by
Congress; 2)the subcommittee must be pursuing a valid
legislative purpose; 3)the question asked the subpoenaed
individual must be pertinent to the subject matter of the
investigation; 4) the individual must be apprised of the
pertinence of the question; and 5) the subcommittee’s
interrogation cannot violate the subpoenaed individual’s First
Amendment rights.44
As reiterated by the Court in Barenblatt v. United States,
“The scope of the power of inquiry, in short, is as penetrating
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and far-reaching as the potential power to enact and appropriate
under the Constitution.”45
Given the Court’s affirmation of both the value of and the
validity for Congress’ power to investigate, it naturally
follows that Congress should have the means with which to
enforce its subpoenas; and it does.

Congress possesses the

power to put those individuals who refuse to answer subpoenas in
contempt.

There are three means through which Congress can

employ its contempt power: 1) inherent contempt; 2) statutory
criminal contempt; and 3) civil contempt.

These three

approaches are discussed below.
B. Inherent Contempt
Before the power to issue contempt citations was codified
by statute, Congress had an inherent contempt power wielded
throughout history and verified by the Supreme Court.

Anderson

v. Dunn represents the first case in which the Supreme Court
expressly acknowledged this power as inherent and valid.

46

In

Anderson, the Court considered the argument that the power of
Congress to punish for contempt can only be employed pursuant to
a legislative grant, but ultimately found that the interests of
Congress in effectively representing the American people were

45

Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111 (1959).
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more persuasive.47

In holding that Congress indeed had an

inherent contempt power, the Court reasoned that the right to
punish for contempt is essential to maintaining the dignity of
and confidence in Congress as a legislative assembly.48
In their report on Congress’s contempt power for the
Congressional Research Service, Morton Rosenberg and Todd B.
Tatelman explain the process for holding an individual in
contempt under the inherent contempt power.49

The process begins

when the offending individual is brought before the House or
Senate by the Sergeant-at-Arms, is then tried at the bar of the
body, and finally can be imprisoned in the Capitol jail.50

The

imprisonment can be punitive, lasting for a specific period of
time as punishment, or coercive, for an indefinite period until
the witness agrees to comply.51

There have also been instances

where the Court has seemingly approved of imposing fines as

47

Id., at 29.
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Id. at 30, 31.
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opposed to imprisonment.52

Inherent contempt proceedings can be

distinguished from other types of contempt proceedings in that
inherent contempt does not require the oversight or cooperation
of either the executive or judicial branches.”53

In other words,

inherent contempt only requires the approval of the chamber
concerned.
Inherent contempt however, is not without its limitations.
In Kilbourn v. Thompson, the Court delineated the boundaries for
when Congress can exercise the contempt power.54 In Kilbourn, the
House of Representative initiated contempt proceedings with
imprisonment as the penalty, against a witness who refused to
answer questions concerning the business of a real-estate
partnership of which he was a member.55

In recognizing the

existence of the contempt power, the Court would curb the
doctrine to “a limited class of cases, or under special

52
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19 U.S. at 227, 228; United States v. United Mine Workers, 330
U.S. 258 (1957) (upholding a fine against a labor union as
punishment for disobedience and an incentive to dismantle a
strike).
53

Rosenberg and Tatelman, supra note 45 at 3.
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circumstances; otherwise the limitation is unavailing and the
power omnipotent.”56

The Court suggested that each body of

Congress is confined in executing the contempt power to
situations in which it is acting pursuant to its appropriate
sphere; for instance, when it is disciplining its own members,
evaluating their elections, or conducting impeachment
proceedings.57
In sum, after Kilbourn, it was clear that although the
Court recognized some degree of an inherent contempt power, it
came with material limitations.

Perhaps this is why the

inherent contempt power was last formally used in 1934.58
Furthermore, inherent contempt has been criticized for other
reasons as well.

According to Rosenberg, “inherent contempt has

been described as ‘unseemly’, cumbersome, time-consuming, and
relatively ineffective, especially for a modern Congress with a
heavy legislative workload that would be interrupted by a trial
at the bar.”59

Although the flaws of inherent contempt

ultimately render it an ineffective tool for Congress, the

56
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Court’s recognition of its existence gives Congress some muscle
with which to exercise its authority to investigate
Statutory Criminal Contempt
A more practical procedure comes in the form of statutory
criminal contempt.

In 1857, Congress passed a federal statute

providing for criminal punishment for contempt, shifting the
inherent contempt power into an authority more concrete and
tangible.

60

According to the Court in Chapman v. United States,

throughout history, when Congress has attempted to gain
compliance with its subpoenas, it has encountered impenetrable
obstacles in the form of “unwilling and contumacious witnesses,”
for which the inherent contempt power was not equipped to
overcome. “It was for the remedy of this evil that the act of
1857 was passed.”61 Today, statutory contempt is codified under 2
U.S.C. §192 and §194. Under §192,
Every person who having been summoned as a witness by the
authority of either House, or any joint committee
established by a joint or concurrent resolution of the two
Houses of Congress, or any committee of either House of
60

Ronald L. Goldfarb, The Contempt Power, 40 (1963).

See also,

Neal Devins, Congressional-Executive Information Access
Disputes: A Modest Proposal-Do Nothing, 48 Admin. L. Rev. 109,
116 (1996) (discussing the history and feasibility of the
contempt power and proposing to maintain the status quo).
61

Chapman v. United States, 5 App. D.C.Cir. 122 (1895).
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Congress, willfully makes default, or who, having appeared,
refuses to answer any question pertinent to the question
under inquiry, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor,
punishable by a fine of not more than $1,000 nor less than
$100 and imprisonment in a common jail for not less than
one month nor more that twelve months.
Section 194 explains how the process functions when the
individual subpoenaed fails to appear or testify, or fails to
produce the requested documents and information: “[t]he failure
or refusal is reported to either House in the form of a
statement of fact, the presiding officer of that House is to
certify the statement to the appropriate United States Attorney,
who is to bring the matter before a grand jury.”62 Additionally,
“a formal report to Congress, made by the committee before whom
the alleged statutory offense was committed is also said to be a
prerequisite to a court trial.”63 Finally, “[t]he procedure
prescribed for initiating criminal contempt proceedings is
mandatory... [and] Congress, by providing for grand jury action,
placed a duty on the federal courts to accord persons prosecuted
62

17 Am. Jur. 2d Contempt §229; 2 U.S.C. § 192. It is unclear

whether the U.S. Attorney has a mandatory or discretionary duty
to refer the matter to a grand jury, but this distinction will
prove to be highly important to the issue of whether the statute
is an effective remedy for the assertions of executive privilege
out of the current U.S. Attorney situation.
63

17 Am. Jur. 2d Contempt §229.
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under the contempt of Congress such safeguards as would be
accorded in other federal criminal cases.”64

Most importantly,

section 194 shifts the enforcement of criminal contempt
citations to the courts.
In Russell v United States, where Congress initiated
prosecutions for refusal to testify, the Court found that one
requirement for a section 192 criminal contempt proceeding is
that the indictment “must identify the subject which was under
inquiry at the time of the defendant’s alleged default or
refusal to answer.”65

The Court stressed that “at the very core

of criminality under 2 U.S.C. §192, is pertinency to the subject
under inquiry of the questions which the defendant refused to
answer.”66

Thus, in order to ensure that the proper procedural

safeguards are in place, “an indictment must do more than simply
repeat the language of the criminal statute.”67
According to Rosenberg and Tatelman, in their report on
Congress’ contempt power, “The criminal contempt statute and
corresponding procedure are punitive in nature.

It is used when

the House or Senate wants to punish a recalcitrant witness and,

64

Id.

65

Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 (1962).

66

Id., at 764.

67

Id.
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by doing so, to deter others from similar contumacious
conduct.”68

Thus, the goal of criminal contempt proceedings is

not coercion, that is, not an attempt to bring the witness into
compliance, but rather to punish.
Since the contempt power is inextricably linked to
Congress’ authority to make inquiries, its availability as a
remedy depends on whether the initial investigation is within
Congress’ legislative domain.69 However, in Chapman v. U.S., the
court recognized that “[t]here is a great difficulty in clearly
and distinctly marking the boundaries within which Congress may
act with coercive power to compel the disclosure of facts deemed
important to it....” The Court found however, that because the
matter under senate investigation directly affected the Senate
itself because it involved the actions and integrity of some of
its own members, there was no doubt that the Senate acted within
the scope of its authority in implicating the criminal contempt
statute.70

This case makes it apparent that the statutory

criminal contempt power is also subject to the requirement that

68

Rosenberg and Tatelman, supra note 29, at 8.

69

7A Fed. Proc., L. Ed. § 17:57. See discussion supra Part

III.A.
70

Chapman v. U.S., 5 App. D.C.Cir., at 9.
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the body of Congress must be acting within certain
constitutional and legislative bounds.
In Barenblatt, the Court analyzed whether §192 was
appropriately applied to punish an individual for contempt for
his refusal to answer certain questions posed to him by a
Subcommittee of the House Committee of Un-American Activities,
regarding alleged Communist infiltration into the field of
education.71

When the petitioner refused to testify, invoking

the 5th Amendment, the matter was referred to the U.S. Attorney
for the District of Colombia to initiate contempt proceedings.72
In holding that the contempt proceedings did not violate the
petitioner’s First Amendment rights, the Court confirmed the
overall constitutionality of section 192.73
Perhaps the most distinctive characteristic of the criminal
contempt statute is that it confers jurisdiction on the courts
to be the final arbitrators of such disputes between the

71

Barenblatt vs. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 114 (1959).

The

petitioner in Barenblatt was asked questions which anyone
familiar with the McCarthy Era would recognize: “Are you now a
member of the Communist Party? Have you ever been a member of
the Communist Party?” to name a few.
72
73

Id. at 115.
Id.

at 134.
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executive and legislative branches.

However, whether the courts

eventually hear the case is within the discretion of the
appropriate U.S. attorney.

Thus, the effectiveness of this

remedy is contingent upon prosecutorial discretion; there is no
guarantee that it will be pursued.
D. Civil Contempt
The final avenue Congress has available to enforce its
investigatory and subpoena powers is through the civil contempt
procedure.

Enacted in 1978 as part of the Ethics in Government

Act, 2 U.S.C. §288b-d and 28 U.S.C. §1365 authorized only the
Senate, and not the House, to bring a civil suit to enforce its
subpoenas.74 Section 1365 grants the U.S. District Court for the
District of Columbia original jurisdiction over Senate actions
to enforce subpoenas.75

The statute provides for the Office of

Senate Legal Counsel to represent the Senate in bringing such
actions before the proper court.76

Under the civil statute, when

the Senate seeks to enforce a judgment concerning a subpoena,

74

28 U.S.C §1365; 2 U.S.C. §288b-d; P.L. 95-521, Ethics in

Government Act of 1978 (Passed in the wake of the Watergate
scandal in order to adjust the balance of power between Congress
and the White House).
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Id.
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“the court will first review the subpoena’s validity.

If the

court finds that the subpoena ‘does not meet applicable legal
standards for enforcement,’ it does not have jurisdiction to
enjoin the congressional proceeding.”77
One of the chief restrictions of civil contempt is that it
includes an exception for enforcement of “any subpoena or order
issued to an officer or employee of the executive branch of the
Federal Government acting within his or her official
capacity...”78

In other words, it cannot be employed against a

member of the executive branch as long as that individual can be
deemed to be operating in the scope of his or her executive
duty. Whether this applies to former executive officials is
unclear.

However, this limitation directly impedes Congress’

ability to enforce subpoenas relating to the U.S. Attorney
firings investigation given that the subpoenaed individuals were
recently or are currently White House officials.

The civil

contempt statute is thus an ineffective remedy for Congress to
assert its authority.
C. Statutory Versus Civil: An Important Distinction
Given the existence of both criminal and civil remedies for
contempt of Congress, it is important to highlight the
differences and consequences in utilizing one in lieu of the
77

Rosenberg & Tatelman, supra note 29, at 13.

78

28 U.S.C. §1365.
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other.

One may ask why the Senate would elect to pursue the

civil route as opposed to the more extreme criminal remedy.
According to Rosenberg and Tatelman, “civil contempt might be
employed when the Senate is more concerned with securing
compliance with the subpoena or with clarifying legal issues
than with punishing the contemnor” because in contrast to
criminal contempt, “in a civil contempt, sanctions can be
imposed until the subpoenaed party agrees to comply....”79
Criminal contempt on the other hand, “may not be purged by
agreeing to testify or produce documents....”80 According to
legal scholar Todd D. Peterson in his analysis of the contempt
power, this difference can have a tremendous impact in the
context of congressional investigations because it demands “a
witness must risk a criminal conviction in order to challenge a
congressional subpoena or to assert a claim of privilege.”81
Additionally, the civil contempt process can be viewed as
more advantageous to Congress because since the stakes are
higher in criminal proceedings, “a court may more closely
scrutinize congressional procedures and give greater weight to

79

Rosenberg & Tatelman, supra note 29 at 13.

80
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Contempt of Congress, 66 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 563, 611 (1991).
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the defendant’s constitutional rights.”82 In criminal
proceedings, the sanctions are more severe and are therefore “a
more threatening and potentially abusive process.”83

Seen from

this angle, Congress may hedge its bets and decide that civil
proceedings could result in a more favorable outcome.
On the other hand, the very fact that the punishment for
criminal contempt is harsh could make it a more effective tool
for Congress.

Perhaps the threat of criminal contempt will be

taken more seriously by recalcitrant witnesses than the more
innocuous civil contempt.

Moreover, unlike civil contempt, the

criminal contempt statute does not carve out an entire exception
for members of the executive branch acting within their
appropriate roles which therefore makes it a more effective
remedy when it is a member of the executive branch who is
subpoenaed.

In sum, both the criminal and civil powers of

contempt are accompanied by certain limitations that potentially
threaten their effectiveness as a remedy.

An analysis of how

this will play out in light of the U.S. Attorney firings
investigation is discussed in Section V.
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Rosenberg & Tatelman, supra note 29 at 12.
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Peterson, supra note 78, at 612.
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III. Department of Justice’s Position on Contempt
In 1984, a memorandum by the Office of Legal Counsel (“OLC”)
was sent out to the Attorney General, expressing a formal
opinion regarding how amendable a member of the executive is to
indictment and criminal prosecution.84 The opinions coming out of
the OLC are designed to assist the Attorney General in his
function as legal advisor to the President.

85

According, they

affect executive policies and are thus highly influential.
Essentially, the position of the OLC on statutory criminal
contempt is that “[a] United States Attorney is not required to
refer a congressional contempt citation to a grand jury or
otherwise to refer a congressional contempt citation to a grand
jury or otherwise to prosecute an Executive Branch official who
carries out the President’s instruction to invoke the
President’s claim of executive privilege....”86
The OLC’s report was a direct response to an investigation led
by the House into the Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”)

84

See Prosecution for the Contempt of Congress of an Executive

Branch Official Who has Asserted a Claim of Executive Privilege,
8 U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 101 (1984) [hereinafter Olson
Memo].
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Olson Memo, at 1.
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enforcement of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980(“CERCLA”).87

The

subpoenas issued by two subcommittees of the House demanded
documents from the EPA’s files.

88

Under the guide of President

Reagan, EPA Administrator, Anne Burford, refused to hand over
the documents, asserting executive privilege.89

According to the

OLC, the question of whether 2 U.S.C. §194 mandates that the
U.S. Attorney pursue the contempt citation, hinges on statutory
construction and separation of powers considerations.90
Regarding separation of powers, the OLC’s takes the
perspective that if Congress were able to criminalize the
assertion of “a presumptively valid claim” of executive
privilege, “the exercise of [that] privilege would be so
burdened as to be nullified.”91

Moreover, the OLC memo states

that “even the threat of a criminal prosecution for asserting
the claim is an unreasonable, unwarranted, and therefore

87

Id. See also, Rosenberg & Tatelman, supra note 31, at 9;

Rosenberg & Tatleman, supra note 51, at 1; Devins, supra note
66, at 117.
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intolerable burden on the exercise by the President of his
functions under the Constitution.”92

Ultimately, the memo

suggests that the congressional action of placing a member of
the executive in criminal contempt amounts to Congress
overstepping its authority at the expense of the executive
branch, thus eroding the separation of powers.
However, it is important to note that the memo specifically
points out that its “conclusions are limited to the unique
circumstances that gave rise to these questions in late 1982 and
early 1983”93-namely the EPA controversy.

This caveat is crucial

because it begs the question of whether the reasoning behind the
OLC opinion can be similarly applied to the contempt proceedings
arising out of the U.S. Attorney firings investigation.
It is not surprising that an opinion compiled by the OLC
will defend executive privilege, for the OLC itself is an
executive agency. However, it does give the executive legs on
which to argue the unconstitutionality of criminal contempt.

If

the law is as the OLC suggests, this would mean that a
congressional investigation into the U.S. Attorney firings would
be virtually impossible.

92
93

Id. at 2, 3.
Id. at 3.
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However, Stanley Brand, the Democratic House counsel during
the Burford cases, criticized the OLC’s stance as “turn[ing] the
constitutional enforcement process on its head.

They are saying

they will always place a claim of presidential privilege without
any judicial determination above a congressional demand for
evidence-without any basis in law.”94

Brand goes further to

interpret the OLC’s words as saying to Congress, “[b]ecause we
control the enforcement process, we are going to thumb our nose
at you.”95

Therefore, although the OLC opinion offers insight

into how the executive branch views the conflict, it does not
necessarily mean that it should be given substantial weight.

IV.

Application to the U.S. Attorney Investigation

Assertions of executive privilege have “stonewalled”
Congress’s investigation into the U.S. Attorney firings.96

As a

result, “Congressional leaders are armed with subpoenas and
contempt citations, and are threatening to conduct a perjury
94

Dan Eggen & Amy Goldstein, Broader Privilege Claimed in

Firings; White House Says Hill Can’t Pursue Contempt Cases,
Wash. Post, July 20, 2007, at A1.
95
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investigation and seek a special counsel.”97

Senator Patrick

Leahy, head of the Senate Judiciary Committee, has made it clear
that Congress will meet such refusals by issuing criminal
contempt citations.98

In fact, the House Judiciary Committee has

officially issued criminal contempt citations against White
House Chief of Staff Josh Bolten and former White House counsel
Harriet Miers.99

However, “the White House has signaled it will

block federal prosecutors from pursuing them.”100

The obstinacy

of both Congress and the White House has led to a political
conundrum: both sides have asserted constitutionally and
judicially recognized powers (contempt and executive privilege)
that are inherently at odds.

Whether Congress or the White

House will prevail is the million dollar question.
Whether Congress can prevail depends on the scope of the
contempt power.

If, as the OLC suggests, the criminal contempt

power can not be implemented against a claim of executive
privilege, it stands to reason that Congress’ efforts to probe
into the details of the firings will be stymied.
97

If, on the
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other hand, Congress’s power to issue criminal contempt
citations is recognized as a valid and essential tool for
oversight of executive activities, then indeed, Congress may be
able to get around the barriers of executive privilege.
Ironically, one of the chief obstacles Congress faces in
implementing criminal contempt citations is not the obstinacy of
the White House, but rather the provisions of the criminal
contempt statute itself.

A key step in the process of pursuing

criminal contempt is that Congress must refer the matter to the
U.S. Attorney for the District of Columbia.101

This results in

an unprecedented conflict because the U.S. Attorney’s Office
itself is the subject of the underlying investigation.

The

criminal contempt proceedings would thus mandate that the U.S.
Attorney, an arm of the executive branch, act directly against
itself.
Relying on the OLC memo, “administration officials argued []
that Congress has no power to force a U.S. attorney to pursue
contempt charges in cases...in which the president has declared
that testimony or documents are protected from release by

101

See 2 U.S.C. §194; discussion supra note 68. See also Dan
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July 20, 2007, at A1.
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executive privilege.”102 One anonymous official stated that “[i]t
has long been understood that, in circumstances like these, the
constitutional prerogatives of the president would make it a
futile and purely political act for Congress to refer contempt
citations to U.S. attorneys.”103
Further insight into how the matter will pan out lies in
Attorney general nominee, Michael B. Mukasy’s responses to
questions put forth by the Senate Judiciary Committee during his
confirmation hearings.104

During the questioning, “Mukasey

indicated it would be hard for the Justice Department to
prosecute [former White House officials] under [these]
circumstances because department lawyers were the ones who gave
advice to the White House that the officials could properly
assert [executive] privilege.”105

He went on to confirm that

“the department, under both Democratic and Republican
administrations, has made it a policy of declining to prosecute
under those circumstances.”106

102

Eggen & Goldstein, supra note 106.

103

Id.

104

Richard B. Schmitt, Hearing for Mukasey Gets Prickly, L.A.

Times, Oct. 19, 2007, at A16.
105

Id.

106

Id.

36

Therefore, as Christopher H. Schroeder (Duke University law
professor and OLC deputy chief from 1994 to 1999) puts it, the
administration’s position “as a legal matter may leave the
Democrats without an effective remedy.”107

If indeed Congress is

powerless to force the U.S. Attorney to act against the
executive, then another option for resolving the matter must be
explored.
V.

Proposal

Before proposing a solution for resolving this dispute, it is
first necessary to briefly dispense with the historic legal
alternatives to criminal contempt.
A. Inherent Contempt is Doomed
First, an argument that Congress can avoid the pitfalls of
criminal contempt by resurrecting inherent contempt is doomed.
Although with inherent contempt Congress could hold its own
trials, thus avoiding referring the matter to the U.S. attorney,
inherent contempt has not been used since 1934 and with good
reason.

It has been characterized as “unseemly, cumbersome,

time-consuming, and relatively ineffective, especially for a
modern Congress with a heavy legislative workload that would be

107
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interrupted by at trial at the bar.”108 There is no reason to
suggest that as applied to the U.S. Attorney investigations,
these problems would disappear.
Finally, as articulated in a newspaper report, “The prospect
of a congressional sergeant-at-arms arresting former White House
Counsel Miers, holding her in custody somewhere on Capitol Hill,
and Congress trying her is unlikely.”109
B. Civil Contempt is Doomed
Resorting to the civil remedy is also an untenable option.
Civil contempt is impractical for two reasons.

First, it can

only be implemented by the Senate, which substantially
diminishes its power and weight.

Second, and even more

importantly, the civil remedy is doomed simply because “it
authorizes a suit against any person subpoenaed except an
officer or employee of the federal government.110

Thus, for all

its merits, the civil contempt remedy is inapplicable to the

108
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U.S. Attorney investigation because the subpoenaed individuals
are officials of the executive branch.111
C. A Judicial Solution: Time for the Courts to Revisit
U.S. v. Nixon
Both Congress and the White House assert deeply rooted
constitutional powers (executive privilege and contempt
citations) that are inherently at odds.

Only the courts have

the independence and authority to ultimately determine which
power shall prevail in this controversy.

The matter should be

brought before the judiciary in order to determine whether
Congress’ subpoenas are enforceable over objections of executive
privilege.

In essence, the Court should revisit United States

v. Nixon.112

111

An argument could be made that since Harriet Miers and Karl

Rove resigned from the Bush Administration, they are no longer
within their “official capacities.”

However, although the

application of the civil contempt statute may depend on how to
interpret “official capacity,” chances are that a court would
interpret the exemption as applying to Miers and Rove because
the substantive information that the subpoenas requested covered
the time period in which they were federal officials.
112

U.S. v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
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A judicial resolution to the standoff between Congress and
the Executive branch is not a novel idea.

Rather, it harkens

back to the most fundamental feature of the United States
government: separation of powers.

When two branches of the

government are at severe odds, where each is convinced that its
authority trumps the other’s, the courts step in to mediate.
This triumvirate system, in which the courts are the final
arbitrators, traces it roots to Marbury v. Madison, where the
Court first established its power of judicial review.113

By

granting the Court the authority to “speak the law” when a
constitutional right is at issue, Marbury elevated the status of
the Court from that of a co-equal branch, to the final overseer
of executive or legislative actions in which an individual right
is at stake.114

Marbury thus represents long-established

precedent for a judicial remedy when the legislative and
executive branches are in disputes over the scope of their
constitutional powers.
Although courts have generally shied away from adjudicating
controversies between the executive branch and Congress,
considering them to be political battles in which the Court
plays a limited role, if ever there were a need for judicial

113
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oversight, now is the time.

Just as the Court in U.S. v. Nixon

determined whether executive privilege shielded the President
from turning over subpoenaed information, the Court should do
the same today.
However, a very specific judicial procedure needs to be in
place for the adjudication of disputes over executive privilege
and congressional subpoenas.

Although the criminal contempt

statute does ultimately involve a judicial remedy, the courts
only come into play if the U.S. Attorney decides to pursue the
case.

Instead of pushing the case through the U.S. Attorney,

Congress should enact legislation to appoint an independent
counsel to prosecute its case.115

115

However, because special

Precedent for an independent counsel was established in

Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988), where the Court upheld
Congressional limitations on the Attorney General’s power to
fire a prosecutor at will.

The statutory framework for an

independent counsel derives from the Independent Reauthorization
Act of 1994. See P.L. 103-270.

The original Independent Counsel

Act was enacted by Congress in 1978 as part of the Ethics in
Government Act, the purpose of which was “to preserve and
promote confidence in the integrity of the federal government.”
28 U.S.C. §595. S. Rep. 103-101, §104; See also, Ethics in
Government Act of 1978, P.L. 95-521.

The Independent Counsel
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prosecutors have not historically demonstrated their ability to
be neutral116, it is crucial that all possible procedures are in
place to ensure true independence.
The best option would be for the Attorney General to
recommend a special prosecutor for a specified term of years who
would have to be approved by Congress.

This special prosecutor

would have independent discretion within the Justice Department
and could only be fired by a showing of good cause, reviewable
by a court.

That way, both branches of the government have to

Act created the entity of special prosecutor who would
investigate officials in the federal government for suspected
wrongdoings. See 28 U.S.C. §595; Independent Counsel
Reauthorization Act of 1994, P.L. 103-270.

However, the

Independent Counsel Act expired in 1999 and has not been
renewed. See Richard K. Neumman Jr., The Revival of Impeachment
as a Partisan Political Weapon, 34 Hastings Const. L.Q. 161. 296
(2007).
116
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a Persistent Problem, 5 Widener L. Symp. J. 79, 80 (2000)
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support the selection and the prosecutor does not have to answer
to the Justice Department. Therefore, the first part of this
proposal installs a special prosecutor, approved by both the
Department of Justice and Congress to litigate the dispute.
The second prong of this proposal establishes a three judge
panel to rule on the issue of whether claims of executive
privilege are proper. This judicial procedure would supplant
sections 192 and 194 of the criminal contempt statute. Three
judge panels are generally convened to adjudicate very narrow
issues of the law, such as Voting Rights or congressional
redistricting cases.117
There are two main purposes of the three-judge panel
system, both of which are applicable to the issue at hand.
First, in such areas where this system is used, such as for
Voting Rights and congressional redistricting cases, it is
because “it is the judgment of the [Senate Judiciary] committee
that these issues are of such importance that they ought to be

117
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heard by a three-judge court....”118

The statutory intent in

providing three judge panels is “to secure the public interest
in a ‘limited class of cases of special importance.’”119
Since it is the Senate Judiciary Committee which initiated
contempt proceedings against the White House officials in the
first place, it stands to reason that the committee would
likewise deem refusals to answer its subpoenas in that category
of issues so important as to warrant review by the collective
judgment of three judges instead of one. Furthermore, just as
Voting Rights cases are heard by a three-judge panel because
they deeply implicate public interests, so too does the matter
of congressional oversight and executive accountability cut
right to heart of public confidence in the government.
The second, perhaps more practical purpose of a three-judge
scheme is “to expedite important litigation.”120

One of the

drawbacks of a judicial resolution for controversies regarding
executive privilege and congressional subpoenas is that the
court system can be so time-consuming. By the time a contempt
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case against Harrier Miers or Joshua Bolten edges its way
through the courts, the political climate will probably have
tempered-the momentum subsided. In other words, if the courts
eventually decide to uphold the congressional subpoenas against
Harriet Miers and Joshua Bolten, by that time, it is likely that
a new administration will already be in place.

Therefore, the

impact of such a decision may be lost, for the public and even
Congress will have probably moved on. However, a three panel
judge procedure would expedite the process.
As a practical matter, in line with other procedures for
the narrow set of disputes which trigger three judge panels,
Congress would bring an action in the United States District
Court for the District of Columbia, for injunctive relief on the
ground that assertions of executive privilege are
unconstitutional.

121

In delegating disputes over the validity of its subpoenas
to a three-judge panel, Congress could model its statute after 2
U.S.C. §922, which provides for three judges in adjudicating
congressional attempts to eliminate budget deficits.122

This

statute serves as an ideal template for Congress to follow
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because it allows for any member of Congress to bring an action
directly to the United States District Court of the District of
Columbia without the downside of appointing the U.S. Attorney or
a special prosecutor.123

In ensuring an expedited process, the

statute imposes a duty on the District Court and the Supreme
Court “to advance on the docket and to expedite to the greatest
possible extent the disposition of any matter brought under
[this] section.”124
Any request for a three judge panel would have to be in
accordance with in 28 U.S.C. §2284(b), which sets out the
procedural requirements.125

Section 2284(b) provides that a

request for three judges be presented to one of the district
judges who would immediately notify the chief judge of the
circuit.126

The chief circuit judge then bears the

responsibility for designating two other judges, one of whom
must be a circuit judge.127

Thus, the ultimate three judges

would include the initial district judge to whom the request was
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originally made, and two other judges, one of whom must be a
circuit judge.128
With precedent already established for a three-judge panel
and a special prosecutor, all Congress has to do is enact the
proper legislation to get the ball rolling.
Conclusion
Ten days after the House Judiciary Committee issued a report
in favor of pursuing contempt proceedings129, a New York Times
article stated that “[i]f Congress wants to maintain its
Constitutional role, it needs to stand up for itself.”130

The

bottom line is that Congress’ powers to enforce its subpoenas
against claims of executive privilege are insufficient.

The

criminal contempt power, in all its forms, is not an adequate
tool with which to resolve the issue.
In order to restore the balance of power within the
government, all three branches need to perform their designated
128
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roles.

In order for Congress to effectively legislate, it must

possess the means by which to conduct a thorough investigation
into allegations of corruption within the government.

At the

same time, its investigative authority is not limitless.
the courts can draw those boundaries.

Only

When the strategy of

negotiation and compromise is exhausted, Congress should require
the Attorney General to recommend a special prosecutor to be
approved by Congress, who would litigate the dispute before a
three-judge panel.

Indeed Congress will run the risk of losing;

however, better an independent judiciary to decide than to give
up the battle.
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